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Abstract: In this paper, I argue that, if ‘the overrepresentation of Christian theists in analytic 
philosophy of religion is unhealthy for the field, since they would be too much influenced by 
prior beliefs when evaluating religious arguments’ (De Cruz and De Smedt (2016), 119), then a 
first step toward a potential remedy is this: analytic philosophers of religion need to restructure 
their analytical tasks. For one way to mitigate the effects of confirmation bias, which may be 
influencing how analytic philosophers of religion evaluate arguments in Analytical Philosophy 
of Religion (APR), is to consider other points of view. Applied to APR, this means considering 
religious beliefs, questions, and arguments couched in non-Christian terms. In this paper, I focus 
on Islam in particular. My aim is to show that Islam is a fertile ground of philosophical questions 
and arguments for analytic philosophers of religion to engage with. Engaging with questions and 
arguments couched in non-Christian terms would help make work in APR more diverse and 
inclusive of religions other than Christianity, which in turn would also be a first step toward 
attracting non-Christians to APR. 
 
Introduction 
 
Given that the ‘world of analytic philosophy is an Anglo- and Eurocentric white male one’ 
(Amico (2015), ix; (2017), 52), it should come as no surprise that Analytic Philosophy of 
Religion (henceforth, APR) is neither diverse nor inclusive. That is, the vast majority of 
published work in APR is concerned with Christianity and the Christian God, to the near 
exclusion of other monotheistic religions, such as Judaism and Islam, not to mention non-
Abrahamic religions, such as Hinduism and Sikhism. As Nancy Frankenberry (2004, 5-6) puts it: 
 
in the work of philosophers such as Richard Swinburne, Alvin Plantinga, William Alston, 
and D.Z. Phillips, philosophy of religion has been deployed in defense of the cogency of 
a standard form of Western monotheism, in the service of a conception of ‘God’ that is 
patriarchal, and in the vested interests of staunchly traditional forms of Christianity (see 
also Frankenberry (2018)). 
 
Statistical evidence for this claim can be collected from PhilPapers, which ‘is a comprehensive 
index and bibliography of philosophy maintained by the community of philosophers’ 
(philpapers.org). There are currently (10/01/2018) 94,189 items in the ‘Philosophy of Religion’ 
topic on PhilPapers. The subcategory ‘Specific Religions’ does contain the following religions: 
Buddhism (3,455), Hinduism (139), Islam (3,127), Judaism (4,244), and Other Religions (16). 
But these count for a mere 11.64% of all the papers in the ‘Philosophy of Religion’ topic. As for 
Christianity, there are 6,724 papers on Christianity in the ‘Specific Religions’ subcategory. 
These search results are summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Numbers and percentages of papers in the ‘Specific Religions’ sub-categories compared 
to all papers in the ‘Philosophy of Religion’ topic on PhilPapers 
 
 Number of papers Percentage of 
“Specific Religions” 
Percentage of 
“Philosophy of 
Religion” 
Christianity 6,724 37.93% 7.13% 
Judaism 4,244 23.94% 4.50% 
Buddhism 3,455 19.49% 3.66% 
Islam 3,127 17.64% 3.31% 
Hinduism 139 0.78% 0.14% 
Other Religions  16 0.09% 0.01% 
Specific Religions, 
Misc. 
20 0.11% 0.02% 
TOTAL 17,725 100% (17,725) 100% (94,289) 
 
 
Within the ‘Philosophy of Religion’ topic on PhilPapers, subcategories that might be considered 
purely APR, such as ‘Arguments for Theism’, ‘Arguments against Theism’, and ‘Divine 
Attributes’, contain even less items on religions other than Christianity. There are currently 1,725 
items in the ‘Arguments for Theism’ subcategory, but only four of them (0.23%) mention Islam, 
and only one of them (0.05%) mentions Judaism. Similarly, there are currently 2,088 items in the 
‘Arguments against Theism’ subcategory, but only ten of them (0.47%) mention Islam, and only 
twelve of them (0.57%) mention Judaism. Likewise, there are currently 1,976 items in the 
‘Divine Attributes’ subcategory, but only six of them (0.30%) mention Islam, and only thirteen 
of them (0.65%) mention Judaism. 
 
Additional statistical evidence for the lack of religious diversity in APR can be collected from 
other databases as well.1 For instance, I have looked at research articles published in one of the 
leading journals in the field of APR, namely, Religious Studies, which mention Christianity, 
Judaism, or Islam (i.e., one of the three, not all three), relative to the total number of research 
articles published in the journal Religious Studies between the years 1965 and 2012.2 I have used 
JSTOR Data for Research (dfr.jstor.org) to collect these data, which are summarized in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Proportions of research articles that mention Christianity, Judaism, or Islam (in all 
fields, including title, abstract, and full text) published in the journal Religious Studies from 1965 
to 2012 (Source: JSTOR Data for Research). 
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As we can see from Figure 1, compared to research articles that mention Judaism3 or those that 
mention Islam,4 research articles that mention Christianity5 clearly make up a significantly larger 
proportion of all the research articles published in Religious Studies between the years 1965 and 
2012. 
 
Similar results can be obtained by looking at data from another leading journal in the field of 
APR, namely, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion. As we can see from Figure 2, 
the data from International Journal for Philosophy of Religion corroborate the aforementioned 
results from Religions Studies. That is, compared to research articles that mention Judaism6 or 
those that mention Islam,7 research articles that mention Christianity8 clearly make up a 
significantly larger proportion of all the research articles published in International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion between the years 1970 and 2014. 
 
Figure 2. Proportions of research articles that mention Christianity, Judaism, or Islam (in all 
fields, including title, abstract, and full text) published in the journal International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion from 1970 to 2014 (Source: JSTOR Data for Research). 
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The aforementioned statistical data suggest that APR does not pay much attention to religions 
other than Christianity, even monotheistic religions other than Christianity, such as Judaism and 
Islam. This has led some philosophers to wonder how intellectually respectable APR really is 
(De Cruz (2013)). For instance, according to Paul Draper and Ryan Nichols (2013, 420): 
 
Work in philosophy of religion exhibits at least four symptoms of poor health: it is too 
partisan, too polemical, too narrow in its focus, and too often evaluated using criteria 
that are theological or religious instead of philosophical. Our diagnosis is that, because 
of the emotional and psychosocial aspects of religion, many philosophers of religion 
suffer from cognitive biases and group influence (emphasis added). 
 
Draper and Nichols (2013) are particularly concerned that work in APR exhibits confirmation 
bias. More explicitly, the fact that most analytic philosophers of religion are Christian theists is 
‘unhealthy’ for the field because such philosophers are unable to evaluate arguments in APR 
without being influenced by their religious beliefs.9 
 
Two independent surveys seem to support the claim that theists, in particular, Christian theists, 
are overrepresented in APR. The results of the PhilPapers Survey show that 72.3% of analytic 
philosophers of religion are theists (or lean toward theism), whereas only 11.7% of philosophers 
who are not analytic philosophers of religion accept or lean toward theism (Bourget and 
Chalmers (2014)). Like David Bourget and David Chalmers (2014), Helen De Cruz and Johan 
De Smedt (2016) have also found that 73% of analytic philosophers of religion are theists. 
Moreover, De Cruz and De Smedt (2016, 130) have found some evidence in support of the 
hypothesis that ‘the religious beliefs of philosophers of religion (who are, to a large extent, 
Christian theists) unduly influence their appraisal of religions arguments.’ As De Cruz and De 
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Smedt (2016, 131) report, such results have led other philosophers to say that APR is ‘unhealthy’ 
(see also Kraay (2013)).10 
 
In addition to concerns about the overrepresentation of Christian theists in APR and cognitive 
biases, such as overconfidence and confirmation bias, others have expressed concerns about the 
relevance of APR to religion. For instance, Levine (2000, 89) argues that APR lacks ‘vitality, 
relevance, and “seriousness”.’ Likewise, Trakakis (2008, 115) writes that: 
 
To many religious believers, particularly those belonging to non-Western religious 
traditions, analytic philosophy of religion would appear to be a philosophy of anything 
but religion (emphasis in original). 
 
Trakakis (2000, 89) argues that there is ‘a disconnection in analytic philosophy of religion 
between the investigator and what they purport to be investigating’ because APR is disconnected 
from ‘the existential and lived dimension’ of religion. Given that most analytic philosophers of 
religion are Christian theists, as the aforementioned studies show, the concern is that APR is 
disconnected from the lived experiences of practitioners of religions other than Christianity.11 In 
that respect, APR lacks in diversity and is not inclusive of religions other than Christianity. 
Assuming that ‘[d]iversity matters’ (Hershock 2012, 1), the fact that APR is neither diverse nor 
inclusive of religions other than Christianity seems to be a problem. 
 
If APR is indeed ‘unhealthy’ in the aforementioned ways, the question is whether it can be cured. 
Is there a remedy for APR’s epistemic ills? This question is my focus in this paper. In other 
words, I take it for granted that APR is ‘unhealthy’ in the ways described above. I am interested 
in what can be done about it. Can APR be cured? What can be done to make work in APR more 
diverse and inclusive of religions other than Christianity?12 
 
In what follows, then, I will propose what may be considered a first step toward remedying 
APR’s epistemic ills. If ‘the overrepresentation of Christian theists in analytic philosophy of 
religion is unhealthy for the field, since they would be too much influenced by prior beliefs when 
evaluating religious arguments’ (De Cruz and De Smedt 2016, 119), then a potential remedy is 
this: analytic philosophers of religion need to restructure their analytical tasks. After all, one way 
to mitigate the effects of confirmation bias, which seems to influence how analytic philosophers 
of religion evaluate arguments in APR (De Cruz (2014)), is to consider other points of view 
(Wickens et al. (2013), 281). Applied to APR, this means considering religious beliefs, 
questions, and arguments couched in non-Christian terms. In this paper, I will focus on Islam in 
particular. My aim is to show that Islam is a fertile ground of philosophical questions and 
arguments for analytic philosophers of religion to engage with. Engaging with questions and 
arguments couched in non-Christian terms would help make work in APR more diverse and 
inclusive of religions other than Christianity, which in turn would also be a first step toward 
attracting non-Christians to APR. 
 
Analytic philosophy of Islam 
 
Granted that APR is ‘unhealthy’ insofar as Christian theists are overrepresented in APR, which is 
problematic because of cognitive biases, such as overconfidence and confirmation bias, and that 
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work in APR is lacking in religious diversity and is not inclusive of religions other than 
Christianity, the question is how APR can be cured. In this section, I will propose what I take to 
be a first step toward restoring APR’s epistemic health. There may be other remedies for APR’s 
epistemic ills. So I do not pretend to claim that my proposal is the only way to deal with the 
aforementioned concerns about APR. But I do think that it is a promising way to deal with those 
problems, especially if our goal is to make work in APR more diverse and inclusive of religions 
other than Christianity. My proposal is grounded in the idea that a ‘helpful approach to 
mitigating confirmation bias and overconfidence is to restructure the analytical task’ (Bruce and 
Bennett (2008), 133). 
 
Here is an example of how to restructure an analytical task, which is likely to be an example that 
most readers of this journal will be familiar with. If a professor wants to encourage active 
learning in the classroom, she might have students take sides on a controversial issue and argue 
for the side they agree with. But then, in order to have students develop a nuanced understanding 
of the controversial issue in question, she would make them switch sides; that is, argue for the 
view they do not agree with. This classroom activity is sometimes called ‘pairs to squares’, 
which is a variation on ‘think-pair-share’ (Gilton (2016), 36). In doing so, professors restructure 
the analytical task for their students in at least two important ways: (a) by asking them to look at 
a controversial issue from a perspective that is unfamiliar to them, thereby encouraging them to 
think in new terms, and (b) by asking them to argue for, rather than against, a view they disagree 
with, thereby encouraging them to reason from assumptions that they do not accept and draw 
inferences that they would otherwise not draw.13 
 
As far as APR is concerned, to restructure the analytical task is to consider beliefs, questions, 
puzzles, problems, and arguments from a viewpoint that is not one’s own. Accordingly, if most 
analytic philosophers of religion are indeed Christian theists, we could restructure the analytical 
task of APR by having analytic philosophers of religion engage with philosophical questions that 
arise in the context of religions other than Christianity when they write articles or teach courses 
in APR. As mentioned above, my focus in this paper is Islam, but I think that the same approach 
can be taken with respect to other non-Christian religions.14 In what follows, then, I will mention 
some of these philosophical questions in order to show that Islam is a fruitful area of research for 
analytic philosophers of religion. To be clear, my claim is not that these are new questions and 
arguments in APR. Rather, my claim is that these questions and arguments are couched in terms 
of a religion other than Christianity, and as such provide ways ‘to restructure the analytical task 
(Bruce and Bennett (2008), 133) of APR, and thereby help address the aforementioned concerns 
about the overrepresentation of Christian theists, the lack of religious diversity and almost 
exclusive focus on Christian theism in APR’s published work, and the threat of cognitive biases 
in APR. Such a restructuring of the analytical task is a helpful approach to mitigating cognitive 
biases, particularly confirmation bias and overconfidence, because it ‘is aimed at challenging the 
mindsets that induce confirmation bias and exaggerate confidence’ (Bruce and Bennett (2008), 
133). 
 
It is also important to mention at this point, as an anonymous reviewer helpfully pointed out, that 
some philosophical problems, questions, and arguments may be irreducibly particular, i.e., they 
may arise only within the context of a specific religious tradition. An example of this might be 
the concept of the Trinity, which seems to raise conceptual questions only within the context of 
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Christianity, but not in the context of Islam, where the strict principle of the oneness of God 
holds. Nevertheless, in what follows, I do hope to show that there are instances in which the sort 
of problems, questions, and arguments typically discussed by analytic philosophers of religion 
can be restructured and couched in non-Christian terms. If analytical philosophers of religion 
were to take the problems, questions, and arguments they typically discuss in their scholarly 
work and in their APR classes, reformulate them in non-Christian terms (e.g., Islamic), and 
engage with them when they write papers or teach classes on APR, then the field of APR would 
take a significant step toward remedying its epistemic ills, or so I propose. 
 
The Shahada and the divine attributes 
 
Of the Pillars of Islam, the first is the Shahada (or declaration of faith): ‘There is no deity but 
God, and Muhammad is the Messenger of God’ (Alavi (2007), 8). The Shahada implies that the 
Prophet Muhammad has a unique status in Islam. Indeed, to suggest that God ‘could create 
thousands of new worlds and Muhammads’ (Qasmi (2014), 198), as Shah Ismail did, can get one 
denounced as an infidel and charged with apostasy for ‘insulting the holy Prophet’ (Jalal (2008), 
81). Nevertheless, for present purposes, this contentious claim suggests a way to restructure the 
analytical task of APR. Here is how. 
 
God is supposed to be omnipotent or all-powerful (Qur’an 8:10). A familiar version of a paradox 
about God’s omnipotence can be stated as follows: can God create a stone so heavy that He 
himself cannot move it? This question poses the following problem concerning God’s 
omnipotence: 
 
If we say that God can create such a stone, then it seems that there might be such a stone. 
And if there might be a stone too heavy for Him to lift, then He is evidently not 
omnipotent. But if we deny that God can create such a stone, we seem to have given up 
His omnipotence already. Both answers lead us to the same conclusion (Mavrodes 
(1963), 221). 
 
More formally, the paradox can be stated as follows: 
 
1. Either God can create a stone too heavy for Him to lift or He cannot. 
2. If God can create a stone too heavy for Him to lift, then God is not omnipotent. 
3. If God cannot create a stone too heavy for Him to lift, then He is not omnipotent. 
Therefore, 
4. Either way, God is not omnipotent.15 
 
Now, the aforementioned suggestion by Shah Ismail provides a way to restructure the analytical 
task of analytic philosophers of religion who are interested in thinking about God’s omnipotence 
in non-Christian terms (and if diversity and inclusion matter, then they should be interested in 
doing so). For it points to the following dilemma. On the one hand, Shah Ismail seems to be 
correct in suggesting that, if God were omnipotent, then He would be able to create many 
Muhammads. Accordingly, if one wants to hold on to the idea of Muhammad’s uniqueness, then 
one would have to conclude that God is not omnipotent. That is: 
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1. If God is omnipotent, then God can create many Muhammads. 
2. There can be only one Muhammad. 
Therefore, 
3. It is not the case that God is omnipotent. 
 
On the other hand, if one wants to hold on to the idea that God is omnipotent, then one would 
have to give up on the idea of Muhammad’s uniqueness. That is: 
 
1. If God is omnipotent, then God can create many Muhammads. 
2. God is omnipotent. 
Therefore, 
3. God can create a thousand Muhammads. 
 
But it appears that one cannot have it both ways; that is the dilemma. To sum up: 
 
1. Either God can create many Muhammads or He cannot. 
2. If God can create many Muhammads, then Muhammad is not unique. 
3. If God cannot create many Muhammads, then God is not omnipotent. 
Therefore, 
4. Either Muhammad is not unique or God is not omnipotent. 
 
This, of course, is a variation on the familiar problem concerning God’s omnipotence, but it is 
now restructured and couched in terms of the religion of Islam. By introducing the Islamic idea 
of Muhammad’s uniqueness, the analytical task of philosophers of religion has been restructured 
insofar as the omnipotence paradox now takes the form of a dilemma between two seemingly 
incompatible ideas in Islam. Restructuring the analytical task of APR in this way, I submit, 
would go some way toward making work in APR more inclusive of religions other than 
Christianity, and thereby help in terms of reducing the threat of cognitive biases in APR. For, 
assuming that most analytic philosophers of religion are indeed Christian theists, this sort of 
restructuring would encourage scholars and teachers of APR to think in new terms, to reason 
from assumptions that they do not typically accept, and draw inferences that they would 
otherwise not draw. In other words, this sort of restructuring ‘is aimed at challenging the 
mindsets that induce confirmation bias and exaggerate confidence’ (Bruce and Bennett 2008, 
133). 
 
An additional dilemma concerning the Shahada has to do with another divine attribute, namely, 
omniscience. God is supposed to be omniscient or all-knowing (Qur’an 8:10). If God is 
omniscient, then He knows the future; that is, God has foreknowledge. But if God has 
foreknowledge, then how can we act freely? For God would know what we will do before we do 
it, which means that we cannot fail to do what God knows we will do. More formally, the 
problem of God’s foreknowledge and human free action can be stated as follows (Wierenga 
(2017)): 
 
1. If God has foreknowledge that S will do A, then it is necessary that S will do A. 
2. If it is necessary that S will do A, then S is not free with respect to doing A. 
Therefore, 
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3. If God has foreknowledge that S will do A, then S is not free with respect to doing A. 
 
Now, the Shahada provides a way to restructure the analytical task of analytic philosophers of 
religion who are interested in thinking about God’s omniscience in non-Christian terms (and if 
diversity and inclusion matter, then they should be interested in doing so). For, in Islam, the 
declaration of faith must be made freely, since ‘There is no compulsion in religion’ (Qur’an 
2:256) according to the Qur’an. If God has foreknowledge, however, then He knows whether one 
will accept Islam as one’s faith or not, which means that one is not free to accept Islam as one’s 
faith. The dilemma, then, can be stated as follows: 
 
1. Either one’s acceptance of Islam is a free act or it is not. 
2. If one’s acceptance of Islam is a free act, then God is not omniscient. 
3. If one’s acceptance of Islam is not a free act, then there is compulsion in religion. 
Therefore, 
4. Either God is not omniscient or there is compulsion in religion. 
 
By introducing the Islamic idea that ‘There is no compulsion in religion’ (Qur’an 2:256), the 
analytical task of philosophers of religion has been restructured insofar as the problem of God’s 
foreknowledge now takes the form of a dilemma between two seemingly incompatible ideas in 
Islam. Again, restructuring the analytical task of APR in this way, I submit, would go some way 
toward making work in APR more inclusive of religions other than Christianity, and thereby help 
in terms of reducing the threat of cognitive biases in APR. 
 
A somewhat similar dilemma arises from the fact that, according to the Qur’an, believers must 
fear God (Qur’an 3:102). As Bruce Lawrence (2015, 48) explains, the Arabic word taqwa means 
‘pious fear of God.’ But to make someone do something, such as declaring one’s faith in God, 
out of fear seems to be a form of compulsion. For example, if a robber points a gun at me and 
tells me to give him my wallet, I will be forced to give him my wallet out of fear of death. 
Similarly, one who fears God seems to be forced to declare one’s faith in God out of fear. So, if 
to make someone do something out of fear is a form of compulsion, then the idea that one must 
fear God seems to be at odds with the idea that the declaration of faith must be made freely, i.e., 
without compulsion. 
 
These, then, are some of the ways in which the analytical tasks of APR, e.g., analyses of the 
divine attributes of omnipotence and omniscience, can be restructured in non-Christian terms, 
e.g., in terms of the Pillars of Islam, such as the Shahada, and the injunction against compulsion 
in religion. This list of philosophical dilemmas about the Shahada is not meant to be exhaustive. 
If there are other conceptual issues with respect to the Shahada, then they will only strengthen 
my suggestion that Islam is a fruitful area of research for analytic philosophers of religion. If we 
want to restructure the analytical task of APR, and thereby address the concerns about the 
overrepresentation of Christian theists, the lack of religious diversity, the almost exclusive focus 
on Christian theism, and the threat of cognitive biases in APR, then analytic philosophers of 
religion should engage with philosophical problems that arise in the context of a religion other 
than their own, such as the aforementioned dilemmas concerning the Shahada and the divine 
attributes of omnipotence and omniscience in Islam. At the very least, doing so would make 
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work in APR more diverse and inclusive of religions other than Christianity, which in turn would 
be a first step toward attracting non-Christians to APR. 
 
Mecca and God’s omnipresence 
 
In addition to the Shahada (or declaration of faith), another Pillar of Islam is the hajj (or the 
pilgrimage to Mecca). As Lawrence (2015, 12-13) explains: 
 
The centerpiece of Muslim ritual is the Ka’ba, a cuboid building in Islam's most sacred 
mosque in Mecca. It houses a black stone, said to be a meteorite from heaven, which is 
linked to both Ishmael, the elder son of Abraham, and his mother, Hagar, Abraham’s 
handmaid. Banished to Arabia, Ishmael and Hagar found solace at the site of the Ka’ba 
and sustenance from its environs, including the Well of Zamzam. 
 
The Ka’ba stone is the point of orientation (qibla) for both daily prayer (salat) and the 
circumambulation (tawaf), which is a key practice in the performance of the pilgrimage (hajj). 
 
The hajj raises interesting conceptual issues when we take into consideration the fact that, in 
addition to being omnipotent or ‘all-mighty’ and omniscient or ‘all-wise’ (Qur’an 8:10), God is 
also thought to be omnipresent or ‘all-pervading’ (Qur’an 2:115). For if God is indeed 
omnipresent, and so wherever one turns, God is there, there would seem to be no need to pray in 
a particular direction. Nevertheless, there is a verse in the Qur’an that talks about God’s throne 
(Qur’an 7:54). The idea that God sits on a throne seems to imply that God has a body, and thus 
can occupy a particular spatial location. In that case, however, God would not be omnipresent 
when He is occupying a particular position in space. 
 
It might seem as if the way out of this conceptual problem is to say that the Ka’ba stone is the 
point of orientation (qibla) for both daily prayer (salat) and the circumambulation (tawaf), not 
because God is believed to reside there, but rather because of its holiness. After all, if the Ka’ba 
stone is indeed ‘a meteorite from heaven’ (Lawrence (2015), 12), then it has a divine origin. But 
that would seem to run counter to the strict principle of the oneness of God (tawhid), and thus 
run the risk of turning the hajj into a form of idol worshiping. For if God is one (ahad) and single 
(wahid), as well as omnipresent, then no particular place can be holier (or more sacred) than any 
other. That is: 
 
1. If God were omnipresent, then no particular place can be holier than any other. 
2. But some places are holier than others (e.g., Mecca). 
Therefore, 
3. It is not the case that God is omnipresent. 
 
On the other hand, if one wants to hold on to the idea that God is omnipresent, then it seems that 
one would have to give up on the theological significance of Mecca as a holy site and the Ka’ba 
stone as having a divine origin, and consequently the hajj itself. That is: 
 
1. If God were omnipresent, then no particular place can be holier than any other. 
2. God is omnipresent. 
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Therefore, 
3. No particular place (including Mecca) can be holier than any other. 
 
Like the dilemma concerning God’s omnipotence and Muhammad’s uniqueness, this dilemma 
suggests that, if God is omnipresent, then no particular thing (e.g., the Ka’ba) or place (e.g., 
Mecca) can be holier (or more sacred) than any other. The dilemma, then, can be stated as 
follows: 
 
1. Either Mecca is a holy place or it is not. 
2. If Mecca is a holy place, then God is not omnipresent. 
3. If Mecca is not a holy place, then there is no need to pray in the direction of Mecca (or 
make a pilgrimage to Mecca). 
Therefore, 
4. Either God is not omnipresent or there is no need to pray in the direction of Mecca (or 
make a pilgrimage to Mecca). 
 
By introducing the Islamic idea of the hajj, the analytical task of philosophers of religion has 
been restructured insofar as the problem of God’s omnipresence16 now takes the form of a 
dilemma between two seemingly incompatible ideas in Islam. Again, assuming that most 
analytic philosophers of religion are indeed Christian theists, this sort of restructuring would 
encourage scholars and teachers of APR to think in new terms, to reason from assumptions that 
they do not accept, and to draw inferences that they would otherwise not draw. In other words, 
this sort of restructuring ‘is aimed at challenging the mindsets that induce confirmation bias and 
exaggerate confidence’ (Bruce and Bennett 2008, 133). 
 
These, then, are some ways in which the analytical tasks of APR, e.g., analyses of the divine 
attribute of omnipresence, can be restructured in non-Christian terms, e.g., in terms of the Pillars 
of Islam, such as the hajj, and the holiness of Mecca. Again, this list of philosophical questions 
about the hajj is not meant to be exhaustive. If we want to restructure the analytical task of APR 
in order to mitigate the effects of confirmation bias, and thereby address the concerns about the 
overrepresentation of Christian theists, the lack of religious diversity, the almost exclusive focus 
on Christian theism, and the threat of cognitive biases in APR, then analytic philosophers of 
religion should engage with philosophical questions that arise in the context of a religion other 
than their own, such as the aforementioned questions concerning the hajj and God’s 
omnipresence. At the very least, doing so would make work in APR more diverse and inclusive 
of religions other than Christianity, which in turn would be a first step toward attracting non-
Christians to APR. 
 
The Qur’an and the primacy of Arabic 
 
According to Shabbir Akhtar (2008, 134), ‘Muslims regard the Quran as the unadulterated word 
of God’ and ‘a revelation directly from God’ (Akhtar (2008), 119). Moreover, the ‘Quran was 
infallibly dictated to the illiterate Muhammad by the arch-angel Gabriel; when completed, it 
became the final and definitive expression of God’s moral and spiritual purpose for all 
humankind for all time’ (Akhtar (2008), 119). These claims about the status of the Qur’an in 
Islam raise interesting philosophical questions for analytic philosophers of religion to consider. 
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First, how can a finite document contain ‘the final and definitive expression of God’s moral and 
spiritual purpose for all humankind for all time’ (Akhtar (2008), 119)? According to Taha Jabir 
Alalwani (2017, XI-XII): 
 
God has rendered the Qur’an so complete that it contains the entire Islamic religion. It is 
the Qur’an that provides the explication of everything, while the Prophet’s example 
provides a comprehensive demonstration of how to apply everything taught in the Qur’an 
(emphasis added). 
 
In other words, the Qur’an is supposed to be ‘logocentric’ (Cornell (1999), 76). But how can a 
finite text provide ‘the explication of everything’? Presumably, there are more things in heaven 
and earth than can be contained in a finite number of verses, to paraphrase Shakespeare. 
 
Second, if ‘the Quran [i]s the unadulterated word of God’ (Akhtar (2008), 134) and ‘a revelation 
directly from God’ (Akhtar (2008), 119), then there would be no need for interpretations and 
commentaries. After all, being ‘all-mighty’ and ‘all-wise’ (Qur’an 8:10), God could have 
revealed the Qur’an in a language so clear and precise that it would require neither interpretation 
nor commentary. But, in fact, there are numerous interpretations and commentaries on the 
Qur’an. Moreover, interpreting and commenting on the Qur’an is made more complicated by the 
notion of ‘abrogation’, which is ‘that some verses of the Qur’an restrict, modify or even nullify 
other verses’ (McAuliffe (2006), 187). Presumably, there would be no need for abrogation if the 
Qur’an were ‘the divine word [that] arouses knowledge of God in the human consciousness’ 
(Cornell (1999), 76). After all, why would God withdraw previously revealed verses? Doing so 
implies that God somehow made a mistake, which seems inconsistent with the divine attributes 
of omnipotence and omniscience.17 
 
Indeed, why did the archangel Gabriel dictate the Qur’an to the Prophet Muhammad in Arabic? 
Again, being ‘all-mighty’ and ‘all-wise’ (Qur’an 8:10), God could have made Gabriel dictate the 
Qur’an to Muhammad in a universal language that all human beings could understand. After all, 
the message of the Qur’an is supposed to be universal. As Lawrence (2017, xii) puts it: 
 
The Arabic Qur’an [...] becomes more than law or guidance or even a sacred book; it is 
also disclosure of the Divine Will for all humankind in all places at all times. Arabic 
becomes not just one among many languages but the key index to salvation, prioritized 
over any other human language (emphasis added). 
 
Rather than prioritize one language over all others, however, a universal message that is intended 
‘for all humankind in all places at all times’ would be more easily transmitted and received by all 
human beings in a universal language that all humankind could understand. Being all-powerful 
and all-knowing, of course, God could have made the entire world one community united by one 
language (cf. Qur’an 5:48). 
 
Having a universal language that could be understood by all would have helped in terms of 
addressing another philosophical question that arises from thinking about the primacy of Arabic 
in Islam as the ‘language of salvation’. For there are followers of Islam who do not understand 
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Arabic, even if they learn how to recite the Qur’an. In that case, when they recite the Shahada, 
but they do not understand its meaning, since they are not fluent in Arabic, is their profession of 
faith sincere? The story of Prince Darmakusuma raises this question (Noertjahajo (1974), 32-35). 
It is a story about the spreading of Islam in Java and a Javanese prince who has an amulet 
entwined in his hair, which prevents him from dying. When the Prince meets the legendary Wali 
Sanga, who are said to have brought Islam to Java, they are able to remove the amulet from his 
hair, and he is finally able to die after reciting the Arabic words inscribed on it. Those Arabic 
words are the Shahada. But, of course, Prince Darmakusuma did not understand what he was 
reciting before his death. So, was his ‘profession of faith’ a sincere one? Was his ‘conversion’ to 
Islam a genuine one? 
 
Finally, there is the question about the authoritative status of the Qur’an. Sunnis and Shiites deal 
with this question somewhat differently. As Tayba Hassan Al Khalifa Sharif (2005, 134) 
explains: 
 
For the Sunnis, the Quran is its own proof by virtue of its i’jaz (miraculous uniqueness). 
[...] For the Shiites, the proof of the verity of the Quran lies with the Prophet, hence ahl 
al-bait [i.e., people of the house] is central to Shiite belief and devotion (emphasis in 
original). 
 
From the analytic perspective of APR, both approaches raise complex philosophical issues. First, 
on the Sunni view, how can the Qur’an be ‘its own proof’? For to say that the verity of the 
Qur’an comes from the Qur’an itself seems circular. Second, if the Qur’an is a source of 
knowledge because it is ‘miraculously unique’, then, depending on what ‘miraculous 
uniqueness’ means, other religious texts may or may not have a claim to ‘miraculous uniqueness’ 
as well. In other words, if what makes the verses of the Qur’an true is the fact that the Qur’an is 
‘miraculously unique’, then it seems that there are other religious texts that could satisfy this 
requirement for being a source of knowledge. For example, the Torah is believed to have been 
revealed to Moses by God on Mount Sinai. Does that count as ‘miraculous uniqueness’? The 
answer to the latter question may be ‘yes’, which is why Jews and Christians are considered 
‘People of the Book’ (Qur’an 29:46) in Islam, which is to say that they also have divinely 
revealed texts, yet the Qur’an is considered the final divine revelation. In that case, however, 
other religious texts that are considered sacred by some, but that Muslims would not accept as 
being genuine divine revelations, might satisfy the ‘miraculous uniqueness’ requirement. For 
example, Mormons believe that the Book of Mormon, which is the unaltered word of God, was 
revealed to Joseph Smith by Moroni, the Prophet Mormon’s son, who has returned in 1823 as an 
angel to reveal the location of the golden plates on which the Book of Mormon was inscribed to 
Joseph Smith (Gutjahr (2012), 15). Does that count as ‘miraculous uniqueness’? 
 
On the Shiite view, the Prophet Muhammad makes the Qur’an a source of knowledge. But this 
requires that God revealed the Qur’an to the Prophet without any error. And how can we be sure 
of that? Perhaps the Prophet misunderstood God’s message. After all, the Prophet is human, and 
thus capable of making mistakes. Perhaps the archangel Gabriel made mistakes while dictating 
the Qur’an to the Prophet. After all, unlike God, the archangel Gabriel is neither omnipotent nor 
omniscient. Perhaps there was an error somewhere in the transmission of the divine message 
from the archangel Gabriel to the Prophet. 
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Indeed, the story of the ‘Satanic verses’ raises an interesting sceptical possibility with respect to 
the status of the Qur’an as divine revelation. According to Ebrahim Moosa (2008, 574): 
 
The story centers on the recitation of the Prophet Muhammad of a portion of revelation 
that gave his Meccan interlocutors the impression that he was endorsing their idols. 
“Those were the high flying cranes whose intercession is sought,” he chanted. On hearing 
this, his Meccan foes understood the innuendo as his endorsement of their idols. Some 
time later the Prophet announced that the revelation was not an angelic inspiration, but a 
satanic one. 
 
The story points to the sceptical possibility that even the verses of the Qur’an that are considered 
divine revelation might be ‘Satanic verses’. For, if we know that the Qur’an is divine revelation, 
then we know that it is not a satanic inspiration mistakenly taken to be divine revelation. Since 
we do not know that the Qur’an is not a satanic revelation--for all we know, it could be--it 
follows that we do not know that the Qur’an is a genuine divine revelation. That is: 
 
1. If we know that the Qur’an is divine revelation, then we know that it is not satanic verses 
mistakenly taken to be divine revelation. 
2. For all we know, the Qur’an could be satanic verses mistakenly taken to be divine 
revelation. 
Therefore, 
3. We do not know that the Qur’an is divine revelation.18 
 
These, then, are some of the philosophical questions that arise from considering the status of the 
Qur’an as the final divine revelation from the analytical perspective of APR. I think that they 
illustrate how recasting the analytical task can open up new avenues of fruitful research in APR, 
make work in APR more diverse and inclusive of religions other than Christianity, and thereby 
help mitigate cognitive biases. Given that this sort of restructuring ‘is aimed at challenging the 
mindsets that induce confirmation bias and exaggerate confidence’ (Bruce and Bennett 2008, 
133), it can be a helpful approach to dealing with the threat of cognitive biases in APR. This list 
of philosophical questions about the status of the Qur’an is not meant to be exhaustive. The fact 
that there may be other conceptual issues with respect to the Qur’an only further backs up my 
suggestion that Islam is a fruitful area of research for analytic philosophers of religion. If we 
want to restructure the analytical task of APR in order to mitigate the effects of confirmation 
bias, as well as address the worry about lack of diversity in APR, analytic philosophers of 
religion should engage with philosophical questions that arise in the context of a religion other 
than their own, such as Islam. At the very least, doing so would make work in APR more diverse 
and inclusive of religions other than Christianity, which in turn would be a first step toward 
attracting non-Christians to APR. 
 
Of course, analytic philosophers of religion may be reluctant or unwilling to restructure their 
analytical tasks in order to make APR more religiously diverse and inclusive, and in the process 
take steps toward mitigating some of the cognitive biases that seem to afflict work in the field. 
But that is beside the point.19 My proposal is about what analytic philosophers of religion should 
do, not what they want or do not want to do. Given that ‘[d]iversity matters’ (Hershock (2012), 
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1), making work in APR more religiously diverse and inclusive is something we should do, 
whether we want to or not. And if, in the process of making work in APR more religiously 
diverse and inclusive, we can remedy some of the epistemic ills that afflict it, all the better. 
 
It might also be objected that restructuring the analytical task of APR, such that questions and 
arguments in APR are couched in terms of a religion other than Christianity (e.g., Islam), will not 
really cure’ its epistemic ills. What would really help APR is to have fewer Christian theists, and 
more non-Christian theists, or even non-theists, do APR. It should be clear that none of the above 
precludes attracting (or attempting to attract) more non-Christians to APR. I will certainly not 
object to that. But, of course, a first step toward attracting non-Christian theists to APR is to 
show that work in APR can be about religions other than just Christianity, in much the same way 
that a first step toward attracting more women to philosophy is to show that women can be role 
models in philosophy, e.g., by including readings from women philosophers in course syllabi 
(Thompson et al. (2016)). As Demarest et al. (2017, 528) have recently found, ‘feeling similar to 
the kinds of people who become philosophers’ is the strongest predictor of taking more 
philosophy courses. In other words, if we want to attract more women to philosophy, we need to 
make sure that they can feel similar to, or can identify with, professional philosophers. As 
Demarest et al. (2017, 532-533) put it: 
 
women who do not feel similar to professional philosophers [...] are not likely to go on to 
take additional courses. [...] Instructors who care about the retention of women should do 
what they can to show their women students how they are similar to professional 
philosophers. 
 
Similarly, analytic philosophers of religion who care about attracting more non-Christian theists 
to APR, as they should if they care about the epistemic health of the field, should do what they 
can to show non-Christians how work in APR can have something in common with their 
personal backgrounds. For, as Demarest et al. (2017, 529) also point out, people need to be able 
to ‘identify with professional philosophers along some dimension’. The dimension can be 
gender, race, ethnic and cultural background, and of course, religion. 
 
In that respect, however, a few words of caution are in order. In order to make APR more 
religiously diverse and inclusive of religions other than Christianity, scholars and teachers of 
APR must become acquainted with religious traditions other than their own. As an anonymous 
reviewer points out, however, this raises a worry, especially as far as teaching APR is concerned. 
For instance, an analytic philosopher of religion who teaches the problem of omnipotence in 
Islamic context to a class of mostly Christian students might give the wrong impression that 
Christianity has better resources to deal with this problem. In order to avoid creating such wrong 
impressions, scholars and teachers of APR must discuss diverse religious traditions competently, 
comparing and contrasting them fairly as far as the traditional problems of APR are concerned. 
This will require analytic philosophers of religion to do more work, of course, but if I am right, it 
will be worth it insofar as remedying APR’s epistemic ills is concerned. 
 
Conclusion 
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In this paper, I have proposed a first step toward addressing the epistemic problems that afflict 
APR as a field. More explicitly, given that ‘the overrepresentation of Christian theists in analytic 
philosophy of religion is unhealthy for the field, since they would be too much influenced by 
prior beliefs when evaluating religious arguments’ (De Cruz and De Smedt (2016), 119), one 
potential remedy is for analytic philosophers of religion to restructure their analytical tasks. For, 
one way to mitigate the effects of confirmation bias, which may be influencing how analytic 
philosophers of religion evaluate arguments in APR, is ‘to restructure the analytical task’ (Bruce 
and Bennett (2008), 133). Applied to APR, this means considering religious beliefs, questions, 
problems, and arguments couched in non-Christian terms. This strategy is ‘aimed at challenging 
the mindsets that induce confirmation bias and exaggerate confidence’ (Bruce and Bennett 
(2008), 133). To that end, I have focused on Islam in particular, and I hope to have shown that it 
is a fertile ground of philosophical questions and arguments for analytic philosophers of religion 
to engage with. Engaging with questions and arguments couched in non-Christian terms, I 
submit, would help make work in APR more diverse and inclusive of religions other than 
Christianity, which in turn would be a first step toward attracting non-Christians to APR.20 
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Notes 
 
1 To be clear, by ‘religious diversity’ here I mean the diversity of religions being discussed in the field of APR, not 
the diversity of the religious beliefs held by practitioners in the field. In this paper, I focus on the former (i.e., 
diversity of religions being discussed in APR) rather than the latter (i.e., diversity of religious faiths of practitioners 
in APR), although some argue that both are problems for the field of APR, as discussed below. 
2 JSTOR Data for Research allows for truncation or ‘wildcard searching’, which is a search methodology that picks 
out variants of a term. By using ‘Christ*’, then, I can search for mentions of Christianity, since the JSTOR database 
will retrieve results that include every word that begins with ‘Christ’, such as ‘Christianity’, ‘Christian’, and the like. 
Similarly, I have used ‘Islam*’ to search for mentions of Islam and ‘Judai*’ to search for mentions of Judaism.  
3 The mean is 0.11 and the standard deviation is 0.04 (n = 48). 
4 The mean is 0.12 and the standard deviation is 0.05 (n = 48). 
5 The mean is 0.77 and the standard deviation is 0.09 (n = 48). 
6 The mean is 0.11 and the standard deviation is 0.07 (n = 45). 
7 The mean is 0.09 and the standard deviation is 0.08 (n = 45). 
8 The mean is 0.69 and the standard deviation is 0.12 (n = 45). 
9 See also Wesley Wildman (2010, xi) on ‘undiagnosed or obstinate religious bias’ and parochialism in APR. As 
Thomas Carroll (2016, 45) explains, the problem is ‘that many philosophers of religion seek to find post hoc 
justifications for previously held views on the nature of ultimacy.’ 
10 As an anonymous reviewer pointed out, it might be argued that APR is just as partisan as some other areas of 
philosophy. That is, one might think that, just as Christian theists are overrepresented in APR, feminist philosophers 
are overrepresented in feminist philosophy, philosophers of a particular ethnic background dominate philosophy of 
race, and so on. It is rather difficult to assess this objection, however, if we do not have data on philosophers who 
specialize in these areas. In APR, we know that there is a significant difference between specialists and non-
specialists with respect to the question concerning the existence of God (Bourget and Chalmers 2014, 483). To the 
best of my knowledge, we do not have similar data about feminist philosophy, philosophy of race, philosophy of 
disability, etc. Moreover, as the same anonymous reviewer also pointed out, there is an important difference 
between APR and feminist philosophy, philosophy of race, and philosophy of disability. These three fields concern 
the issues of socially marginalized groups, such as women, people of colour, and people with disabilities, whereas 
male Christian theists can hardly be said to be members of a socially marginalized group. 
11 Cf. Carroll (2016) on what he calls APR’s ‘problem of relevance.’ 
12 Of course, I am not saying that there are no non-theists and/or non-Christian analytic philosophers of religion and 
the aforementioned data support no such claim. Rather, the issue is the underrepresentation of religions other than 
Christianity in published work in APR (i.e., in journal articles and books). Likewise, the ‘cure’ I am recommending 
in this paper is to make work in APR more diverse and inclusive of religions other than Christianity, not to make the 
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profession of APR more inclusive of philosophers other than Christian thesis, although the latter might be something 
we would like to do as well (but that is beyond the scope of this paper). 
13 On the use of such debiasing techniques in research more generally, see Nuzzo (2015). 
14 See, for example, Mizrahi (2012). 
15 For more on the divine attributes and some puzzles associated with them, see Mizrahi (2013). 
16 How can an immaterial being like God be located at each and every place? See, e.g., Inman (2017). 
17 For more on the problem of abrogation, see Afsaruddin (2015), 190-192. 
18 Of course, the notions of Satan and ‘Satanic verses’ raise philosophical questions that are usually discussed under 
the heading ‘Problem of Evil’. For a recent discussion of such problems, see Mizrahi (2014). 
19 One might get this impression from works such as Plantinga (1984). 
20 I have worked on this paper while participating in a National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) Summer 
Institute on Islam in Asia at the East-West Center of the University of Hawai’i at Manoa (June-July 2017). I am 
grateful to the co-directors, Peter Hershock and Nelly van Doorn-Harder, and all the participants for a rich and 
rewarding intellectual experience. I have presented an earlier version of this paper at the annual meeting of the 
Florida Philosophical Association (November 2017) and I thank the audience for helpful criticisms and suggestions. 
Lastly, I am also grateful to two anonymous reviewers of Religious Studies for helpful comments on earlier drafts of 
this paper. 
